An Inestimable Safeguard Gives Way to Practicality: Eliminating the Juror Who   Refuses to Deliberate  Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(b)(3) by Bellin, Jeffrey
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
2006
An Inestimable Safeguard Gives Way to
Practicality: Eliminating the Juror Who ""Refuses to
Deliberate" Under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 23(b)(3)
Jeffrey Bellin
William & Mary Law School, jbellin@wm.edu
Copyright c 2006 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Bellin, Jeffrey, "An Inestimable Safeguard Gives Way to Practicality: Eliminating the Juror Who ""Refuses to Deliberate" Under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(b)(3)" (2006). Faculty Publications. 1661.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/1661
An Inestimable Safeguard Gives Way
to Practicality: Eliminating the Juror
Who "Refuses to Deliberate" Under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
23(b)(3)
JEFFREY BELLIN*
I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................. 631
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON INTERFERENCE WITH
JURY DELIBERATIONS .................................................... 633
A. Permissibility of a Jury of Fewer Than Twelve
Jurors ................................................................... 633
B. Permissibility of a Non-Unanimous Verdict ........... 634
III. A DELICATE BALANCE: FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 23(B)(3) ..................................................... 636
A. Jury Notes: The First Sign of a Potential
D isqualification ..................................................... 639
B. Role Reversal: Questioning of the Jurors .............. 642
C. The Decision to Disqualify: Whether Good
Cause Exists .......................................................... 644
D. Post-Disqualification Choices: Replacement with an
Alternate or Deliberation with Eleven .................... 650
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF GOOD CAUSE DISMISSALS FOR
REFUSING TO DELIBERATE ............................................... 651
I. INTRODUCTION
As recent high profile trials have demonstrated, the jury delib-
eration process, like the process for producing legislation or sau-
sage, is best appreciated from a distance. Given the virtually
unlimited pool from which potential jurors are drawn and the ran-
dom jury selection process, it should not be surprising that jury
deliberations in particular cases range from inspirational to scan-
dalous. Despite its inherent unpredictability, trial by jury enjoys a
sacred place in American culture. As the United States Supreme
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Court has written, the right to a jury trial in a criminal case pre-
sents "an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous
prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge."'
In a small but significant number of trials, however, this safeguard,
in the form of an unmovable individual juror can frustrate not only
the will of the "overzealous" prosecutor and "eccentric" judge, but
alternatively the wills of the defense counsel, the participants (wit-
nesses, defendants, and victims), and the vast majority of fellow
jurors, necessitating a retrial in an otherwise clear case.
Given the fabled power of one individual juror to frustrate the
will of the other jurors--celebrated, for example, in the 1957
movie classic Twelve Angry Men-most Americans would be sur-
prised to learn that the lone holdout juror is dischargeable. In fed-
eral court, if a judge determines that there is "good cause," the
holdout juror can be dismissed from the jury, even after delibera-
tions have begun, allowing a "unanimous" verdict of eleven.2
This essay discusses the application and implications of "good
cause" dismissal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
23(b)(3), specifically with respect to the dismissal of a "non-
deliberating" juror.3 The following discussion delineates the con-
stitutional limitations on the use of this procedure, and describes
the ways in which courts have, with mixed results, attempted to
structure the process for eliminating a juror without running afoul
* Jeffrey Bellin is a former prosecutor with the United States Attor-
ney's Office for the District of Columbia. He currently works as an appellate
attorney at the Court of Appeal for the State of California.
1. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). Not every criminal
prosecution implicates the right to a jury trial. The Supreme Court has ruled that
the Constitution mandates a jury trial only for criminal offenses that are punish-
able by imprisonment for more than six months. See Lewis v. United States,
518 U.S. 322, 327, 330 (1996).
2. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b)(3) ("After the jury has retired to deliber-
ate, the court may permit a jury of 11 persons to return a verdict, even without a
stipulation by the parties, if the court finds good cause to excuse a juror.").
3. Of course, the "primary mechanism" to "ensure that the seated jurors
are capable of participating effectively in deliberations" is a probing and thor-
ough voir dire process. United States v. Symington, 195 F.3d 1080, 1088 n.9
(9th Cir. 1999). Unfortunately, due to the volume of criminal cases, there is
often not enough time for (and many courts will not permit) anything but the
most perfunctory voir dire.
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of cherished jury trial traditions. The analysis highlights the ten-
sion between the ideal of verdicts rendered independently by lay
juries, and the day-to-day requirements of the administration of
justice by courts.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON INTERFERENCE WITH JURY
DELIBERATIONS
The jury trial right in criminal cases is enshrined in the United
States Constitution in two places. The Sixth Amendment requires
that "the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury." Article II similarly mandates that "[tihe
Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by
Jury.",4 These references are devoid of specifics. Hence, the pre-
cise contours of the jury trial right are flexible and have evolved
over time.
The removal of a juror and a verdict by the remainder of the
jury implicates two traditionally accepted prerequisites of a jury
trial: (i) that the jury must consist of twelve persons, and (ii) that
the jury's verdict must be unanimous. The final arbiter of federal
constitutional law, the United States Supreme Court, has spoken
with respect to both of these prerequisites.
A. Permissibility of a Jury of Fewer Than Twelve Jurors
In the 1970s, the Supreme Court grappled with the constitu-
tional requirements for the minimum number of jurors on a crimi-
nal jury. The operative cases arose in challenges to state court
criminal petit juries consisting of as few as six jurors.5 Determin-
4. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. In addition, the Seventh Amendment
to the Constitution guarantees the jury trial right in civil cases "where the value
in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars." U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
5. The cases arose in a state context primarily because it had long been
assumed that the Federal Constitution mandates a criminal petit jury of twelve.
See, e.g., Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930) (noting that it is "not
open to question" that the "essential elements" of a jury trial include "[t]hat the
jury should consist of twelve men, neither more nor less .... and ... that the
verdict should be unanimous"); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349 (1898)
(tracing the right of a jury of twelve persons to the Magna Charta and stating
that "the next inquiry is whether the jury referred to in the original constitution
2006
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ing the scope of the "jury trial" right imposed upon the states by
the Federal Constitution through the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court in Williams v. Florida6 ruled that a six-person jury was con-
stitutionally permissible in state court, and, the Court announced,
in federal court as well.7 The Court found that the number of ju-
rors had become fixed at twelve by "historical accident," and held
that a twelve-person jury "cannot be regarded as an indispensable
component of the Sixth Amendment."8
The expansive opinion in Williams made it possible for the
rules of procedure in federal court to allow the removal of a recal-
citrant juror, and a resulting verdict of fewer than twelve jurors.9
Apart from this situation, however, Congress and the Court have
not moved to diminish the number of jurors seated in federal
criminal cases. The federal criminal rules continue to mandate
that, as a general principle, "[a] jury consists of 12 persons."'
B. Permissibility of a Non-Unanimous Verdict
The removal of a "non-deliberating" juror and a verdict ren-
dered by the eleven remaining jurors also implicates the traditional
requirement that a verdict be unanimous. Despite some loosening
by the Supreme Court, this requirement still exists in federal court.
and in the sixth amendment is a jury constituted, as it was at common law, of
twelve persons, neither more nor less. This question must be answered in the
affirmative.") (citation omitted).
6. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
7. Id. at 98-103.
8. Id. at 89, 100. Subsequently, in Ballew v. Georgia, the Supreme
Court held that a jury consisting of any less than six jurors is unconstitutional in
both state and federal court. 435 U.S. 223, 239, 245 (1978).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Stratton, 779 F.2d 820, 830-35 (2d Cir.
1985) (citing Williams as enabling Congress to "legislate as to jury size" and,
therefore, "the Supreme Court [to] prescribe [same] by rule, pursuant to the
Enabling Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771, 3772 (1982)").
10. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b)(1). By contrast, the federal rules of civil pro-
cedure allow a civil jury to consist of anywhere from six to twelve jurors. FED.
R. Civ. P. 48.
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In Apodaca v. Oregon," the Supreme Court ruled that the
Federal Constitution does not require juries in state court to render
unanimous verdicts. 2 The plurality opinion in Apodaca reasoned
that unanimity is not required by the Sixth Amendment, and there-
fore not a prerequisite to conviction in state or federal court.'3 This
was not the holding of the Court, however. Justice Powell, in an
opinion not joined by any other Justice, concurred in the judgment,
but not in the reasoning of the plurality opinion. Justice Powell
wrote that unanimity was required by the Sixth Amendment, but
that this requirement was not sufficiently "fundamental" to the jury
trial right to be imposed upon the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 4 In Justice Powell's view, and more significantly,
the view shared by the four dissenting members of the Court,
"unanimity is one of the indispensable features of the federal jury
trial," and, therefore, "the Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous
jury verdict to convict in a federal criminal trial."' 5 Thus, five Jus-
tices in Apodaca determined that a unanimous jury is required in
federal trials.'6 That determination has not been revisited by the
Court.
As discussed below, the continuing requirement of unanimity
exhibited in Apodaca, and now part of the federal rules, 7 animates
the most significant constraint on the application of Rule 23(b)(3).
Neither the fractured holding in Apodaca, nor the Federal Rules'
general requirement of unanimity, however, has been utilized to
11. 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (plurality opinion) (upholding state criminal
convictions based on jury votes of 11-1 and 10-2 for conviction of codefen-
dants).
12. Id. at 413-14.
13. Id. at 411-12.
14. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 366, 373, 375 (1972) (Powell, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (criticizing Court rulings that map federal rights
directly onto states as "depriv[ing] the States of freedom to experiment with
adjudicatory processes different from the federal model").
15. Id. at 369, 371.
16. Cf United States v. Brown, 823 F.2d 591, 595 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (not-
ing that in Apodaca, "five members of the Supreme Court interpreted th[e Sixth]
amendment to endow a federal criminal defendant with the right to a unanimous
verdict").
17. See FED. R. CRPM. P. 31(a) (requiring that a jury "verdict must be
unanimous").
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successfully challenge Rule 23(b)(3) itself (as opposed to particu-
lar applications of the rule). 8 In fact, the Advisory Committee
Notes to Rule 23(b) state:
Though the alignment of the Court and especially the
separate opinion by Justice Powell in Apodaca v. Ore-
gon makes it at best uncertain whether less-than-
unanimous verdicts would be constitutionally permissi-
ble in federal trials, it hardly follows that a requirement
of unanimity of a group slightly less than 12 is similarly
suspect.19
III. A DELICATE BALANCE: FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 23(B)(3)
The drafters of Rule 23(b)(3) ii ded the rule to remedy the
situation where, after a lengthy trial, a juror's death or illness dur-
ing deliberations necessitated a mistrial, resulting in "a second ex-
penditure of substantial prosecution, defense and court re-
sources."'2 As the Advisory Committee Notes acknowledge, how-
ever, the Rule reaches beyond this situation requiring only that
"good cause" be shown to justify excusing a juror.2  No further
18. Facial challenges to the constitutionality of Rule 23(b) have consis-
tently been rejected at the appellate level. See, e.g., United States v. Ahmad,
974 F.2d 1163, 1164 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that Williams v. Florida "com-
mands the conclusion that Rule 23(b) is constitutionally valid"); United States v.
Gabay, 923 F.2d 1536, 1544 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing Williams in holding rule
constitutional); cases cited infra note 19.
19. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b) advisory committee's notes to 1983 Amend-
ments (citation omitted); see also United States v. Walsh, 75 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.
1996) (holding without analysis that "rendition of a verdict agreed to by all ju-
rors, after one juror with unknown views has been dismissed for cause, is a
unanimous verdict"); United States v. Smith, 789 F.2d 196, 205 (3d Cir. 1986)
(holding without analysis that "[c]ontrary to the defendant's contention, Rule
23(b) does not allow a less than unanimous verdict").
20. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b) advisory committee's notes to 1983 Amend-
ments.
21. Id. (noting need to address situation where "one of the jurors is seri-
ously incapacitated or otherwise found to be unable to continue service upon the
jury") (emphasis added); see United States v. Beard, 161 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th
Vol. 36
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definition of "good cause" is included, and consequently, it has
fallen to the courts to define the contours of the phrase.2
"Good cause" could potentially encompass a wide range of
behaviors from a juror's death at one extreme to a juror's unwill-
ingness to accept the verdict of the majority at the other. The easi-
est cases of "good cause" disqualification fall within the category
of serious incapacitation, such as death, or an unanticipated
lengthy absence, where a juror is simply unable to continue with
deliberations. Appellate courts rarely reverse district courts that
dismiss an incapacitated or absent juror.23  Reversals occur only
when jurors are dismissed for absences that are exceedingly brief,
or where no inquiry is made into the potential duration of the ju-
ror's absence.24
Another subset of disqualifications arises when, during delib-
erations, it becomes apparent that a juror is not qualified for ser-
vice (e.g., has a felony conviction), has violated her juror's oath by
speaking to non-jurors about the case, or has had something hap-
pen (e.g., a confrontation with a trial participant) that jeopardizes
Cir. 1998) ("Although 'just cause' generally focuses on sickness, family emer-
gency, or juror misconduct, it 'embraces all kinds of problems-temporary as
well as those of long duration--that may befall a juror during deliberations.').
22. The Federal Criminal Rules were amended in 2002 "to make style
and terminology consistent throughout the rules." FED. R. CRIM. P. 23 advisory
committee's notes to 2002 Amendments. One change was that the original
23(b)(3) which allowed removal for "just cause" was amended to allow removal
for "good cause." Id. As the notes explain, "[n]o change in substance is in-
tended." Id.
23. See, e.g., United States v. Armijo, 834 F.2d 132, 135 (8th Cir. 1987)
(finding no abuse of discretion where trial court dismissed juror who had been in
automobile accident and would not be available to resume deliberations until at
least the following week); United States v. Stratton, 779 F.2d 820, 830-35 (2d
Cir. 1985) ("[T]he trial judge was entitled to conclude that an adjournment of 4
V/ days [due to religious observance] would be less desirable than an eleven-
juror verdict.").
24. See, e.g., United States v. Patterson, 26 F.3d 1127, 1129 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (reversing eleven-member jury conviction where trial court dismissed
absent juror without determining likely extent of absence); United States v. Ta-
bacca, 924 F.2d 906, 913-15 (9th Cir. 1991) (ruling the same where trial court
dismissed juror whose wife had taken his car keys and so was not available to
deliberate that day, but would be available the next day).
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the juror's ability to be impartial.25 Again, such dismissals, while
creating tactical issues for the counsel involved, are relatively non-
controversial.
The more difficult and most controversial cases of "good
cause" disqualification arise under the rubric of a so-called "refusal
to deliberate." Perhaps due to the difficulty of doing so coherently,
courts that dismiss jurors for "refusing to deliberate" rarely define
the concept--except to say that it has occurred on the particular
facts then before them. The most comprehensive discussion of the
phenomenon is found in a California Supreme Court opinion.26 In
the words of that court:
A refusal to deliberate consists of a juror's unwillingness
to engage in the deliberative process; that is, he or she
will not participate in discussions with fellow jurors by
listening to their views and by expressing his or her own
views. Examples of refusal to deliberate include, but are
not limited to, expressing a fixed conclusion at the be-
ginning of deliberations and refusing to consider other
points of view, refusing to speak to other jurors, and at-
tempting to separate oneself physically from the remain-
der of the jury.27
While the practical problems with a juror exhibiting the above
characteristics are clear, it is not immediately obvious that such a
juror is disqualified from serving. In the leading federal case for
removal of a non-deliberating juror, United States v. Thomas,28 the
25. E.g., United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1186 (2d Cir. 1989)
(upholding trial court's dismissal of juror who received threatening phone call);
United States v. McFerren, 907 F. Supp. 266, 269 (W.D. Tenn. 1995) (using
Rule 23(b)(3) to remove juror revealed to be a convicted felon, and therefore
ineligible for service under 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5)).
26. Juror removal is allowed in California state court, as in the recent
highly publicized trial of Scott Peterson, under CAL. PENAL CODE § 1089 ("If at
any time ... a juror dies or becomes ill, or upon other good cause shown to the
court is found to be unable to perform his or her duty .... the court may order
the juror to be discharged and draw the name of an alternate, who shall then take
a place ... as though the alternate juror had been selected as one of the original
jurors.").
27. People v. Cleveland, 21 P.3d 1225, 1237-38 (Cal. 2001).
28. 116 F.3d 606 (2d Cir. 1997).
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Second Circuit explained that where a juror is able to deliberate
impartially, but refuses to do so, that juror is "purposefully disre-
garding the court's instructions on the law," and failing to follow
his oath as a juror.29 Thus, in Thomas, where the trial court found
that a juror believed "that the defendants had 'a right to deal
drugs,"' and acted "in purposeful disregard of the evidence, defy-
ing the court's instructions on the law," that juror was properly
dismissed for refusing to engage in the deliberative process.3" The
Second Circuit recognized that this holding treads closely upon the
broad powers of the American jury.31 It acknowledged that
throughout American history, jurors have had the power to acquit
for any reason. The court argued, however, that they did not have
the right to do so.32 To the contrary, the court stated, jurors have in
fact a "sworn duty to follow the law. 33 Thus, the Second Circuit
ruled that courts have a related duty to "forestall or prevent" refus-
als to impartially deliberate "by dismissal of the offending juror
from the venire or the jury. 34
A. Jury Notes: The First Sign of a Potential Disqualification
Most reported cases involving a refusal to deliberate occur in
the context of a lone holdout juror.35 When such a situation arises,
29. Id. at 612. A standard jury instruction requires that jurors swear to
"render a true verdict according to the law and the evidence." Id. at 614.
30. Id. at 614, 617-18.
31. The court specifically referenced the power of "jury nullification."
Id. at 614. The court noted obliquely that "nullification" can cover "a number of
distinct, though related, phenomena, encompassing in one word conduct that
takes place for a variety of different reasons." Id. A precise definition of jury
nullification is beyond the scope of this article. It is sufficient to note here that
"nullification" is one way that a juror can "refuse to deliberate," or as the Ninth
Circuit put it, refuse to "deliberate impartially." United States v. Symington,
195 F.3d 1080, 1085, 1087 (9th Cir. 1999) (analyzing Thomas) (emphasis
added).
32. Thomas, 116 F.3d at 615.
33. Id. at 616.
34. Id.
35. Predictably, published appellate opinions concern only those cases of
a lone holdout for acquittal. This is because the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution (double jeopardy) prohibits a retrial after an acquittal. Cases where
2006
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trial courts proceed cautiously down the path to juror disqualifica-
tion as that path is rarely taken36 and inevitably intrudes upon the
sanctity of jury deliberations.
The first step toward juror disqualification is generally a note
from the jury indicating a problem reaching a verdict. A sampling
of such notes indicates the wide variety of potential scenarios:
* "We cannot come to a unanimous agreement ... for
reasons unrelated to debate about the evidence."
37
holdouts for conviction are removed and the jury acquits cannot be appealed,
and would therefore not result in an appellate opinion. This should not be inter-
preted, however, to mean that Rule 23(b)(3) is only beneficial to the prosecu-
tion. The Supreme Court has noted that "[t]he most complete statistical study of
jury behavior has come to the conclusion that when juries are required to be
unanimous, 'the probability that an acquittal minority will hang the jury is about
as great as that a guilty minority will hang it."' Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S.
404,411 n.5 (1972) (quoting H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 461
(1966)); see also United States v. Stratton, 779 F.2d 820, 834 n.15 (2d Cir.
1985) (citing this study and others for similar contention).
36. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's notes to 1983
Amendments (noting that this is "a situation which does not occur with great
frequency"). While the Advisory Committee Notes may be underestimating the
frequency of this occurrence (at least at present), there are two major reasons
why Rule 23(b)(3) is not invoked as often as it could be:
(1) In many cases, neither the parties nor the court will be
aware that a holdout juror exists. In fact, it is only when the
majority or minority juror(s), on their own initiative, identify
this issue that the trial court will be able to take action. Jurors
are unlikely to be aware that a mechanism exists for removing
a recalcitrant juror, and therefore, may not bring such a cir-
cumstance to the attention of the court. Thus, it is likely that
most cases of holdout jurors are only discovered (if at all) after
a mistrial is declared and the jury has been discharged.
(2) Even if the jurors self-identify their collective dysfunction,
prosecutors and especially courts may be reluctant to generate
an appellate issue by pushing for an eleven-person conviction.
From the court's perspective especially, a declaration of a mis-
trial is simpler and safer, as it is essentially immune from ap-
peal. From the prosecutor's perspective, if eleven jurors are
convinced of the defendant's guilt, it is likely that a second
trial or a plea agreement will result in a conviction.
37. Brown v. United States, 818 A.2d 179, 181 (D.C. 2003).
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* "We request an alternate to replace one juror. One ju-
ror does not agree with the charge and does not show a
willingness to apply the law .... Please provide direc-
tion in this matter.,
38
* "Your Honor, we respectfully request direction. One
juror has stated their final opinion prior to review of all
counts. 39
* "Juror No. Four... has a prejudice and lacks the ra-
tional common sense to deliberate in a logical way.'"
°
* "A juror doesn't want to participate in arriving at a ver-
dict. What do we do?"4'
e "I Bernard Spriggs, am not able to discharge my duties
as a member of this jury.-42
As these notes suggest, the cases generally hinge upon a jury
note that signals to the judge that one juror is detrimental to the
jury's deliberations. Often, these notes will follow on the heels of
more general notes, such as "we are deadlocked" or "we cannot
reach a verdict.,
43
38. People v. Cleveland, 21 P.3d 1225, 1227-28 (Cal. 2001).
39. United States v. Symington, 195 F.3d 1080, 1083 (9th Cir. 1999).
40. United States v. Hernandez, 862 F.2d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1988).
41. United States v. Huntress, 956 F.2d 1309, 1311 (5th Cir. 1992).
42. United States v. Brown, 823 F.2d 591, 594 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
43. A note stating that a jury cannot reach a verdict is fairly common
early in the deliberation process. Most judges simply respond with an oral or
written exhortation that the jurors continue their deliberations. Cleveland, 21
P.3d at 1234 ("[Ilt often is appropriate for a trial court that questions whether all
of the jurors are participating in deliberations to reinstruct the jurors regarding
their duty to deliberate and to permit the jury to continue deliberations before
making further inquiries that could intrude upon the sanctity of deliberations.").
At this point, the jury is left to try to resolve their issue internally through per-
suasion or, in rare cases, improper threats of force. Shotikare v. United States,
779 A.2d 335, 346 (D.C. 2001) (finding a threat of physical violence just cause
for removal). Generally, if internal resolution is unsuccessful, a subsequent note
will appear, either repeating the earlier note, adding more description, or signal-
ing a worsening of the situation. For purposes of completeness, it is worth not-
ing the existence of another weapon in the district court's arsenal, so-called anti-
deadlock charges. These charges, themselves the subject of great controversy,
contain various elements designed to exhort the jury to reach a verdict, inform-
ing the jurors, inter alia, that in a large proportion of cases absolute certainty
cannot be achieved, that a mistrial will subject the parties to the strain and ex-
2006
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B. Role Reversal: Questioning of the Jurors
Once the potential for a "good cause" disqualification has
been brought to the trial court's attention, it becomes the court's
prerogative, or in some jurisdictions, duty, to investigate the issue.
As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has stated:
[I]t would be a dereliction of duty for a judge to remain
indifferent to reports that a juror is intent on violating his
oath [by refusing to properly deliberate] .... A federal
judge, whose own oath of office requires the judge to
"faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the
duties incumbent upon [the judge] ... under the Consti-
tution and laws of the United States," may not ignore
colorable claims that a juror is acting on the basis of
such improper considerations. 44
While Rule 23(b)(3) provides the authority to eliminate a non-
deliberating juror, it does not suggest any mechanism for doing so.
This allows courts discretion in tailoring their own procedures for
determining whether "good cause" exists. Generally, courts pro-
ceed by speaking to each juror individually, with counsel present.a5
The most common practice is to begin with the jury foreperson, or
the individual juror who signed the note that initiated the process.
The court's inquiry into the jurors' deliberations is of neces-
sity highly circumscribed. Unscripted court questioning of delib-
erating jurors can easily lead to, at the very least, the appearance of
pense of a retrial, and that the jurors in the minority should consider the views of
those in the majority with an open mind. See generally United States v. McE-
hiney, 275 F.3d 928 (10th Cir. 2001) (discussing propriety of various anti-
deadlock charges).
44. United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 616 (2d Cir. 1997) (third
alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 453 (1994)).
45. In Thomas, however, the district court inquired of each juror in cam-
era without counsel present (but on the record), and then summarized its find-
ings for counsel. 116 F.3d at 610; see also United States v. Ruggiero, 928 F.2d
1289, 1295 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that the district court interviewed the juror




undue judicial influence upon jury deliberations. A typical inquiry
proceeds as follows:
COURT: Juror number four, we have received the
jury's notes, and I am now going to ask you some ques-
tions. I would like to caution you that in your responses,
please do not reveal to us: the direction the jury is lean-
ing, the numerical jury split, or anything about the con-
tent of your deliberations. Do you understand? 46
JUROR: Yes.
COURT: In your opinion, are all of the jurors participat-
ing in deliberations?
JUROR: No.
COURT: Which juror or jurors are not participating?
JUROR: The juror sitting in the first row at the end of
the row.
COURT: What makes you say that the juror is not par-
ticipating?
JUROR: He simply announced his opinion when we
went in, and said his mind is set. He doesn't respond to
any of the other jurors when they ask him questions; he
just sits in the comer.
In addition to scripting its own colloquy, the court must de-
termine which of the jurors to examine. In at least one reported
case, the court spoke to jurors selected at random.47 A more com-
mon procedure is to speak to each of the remaining jurors (i.e.,
those not yet questioned) in order, by seat number, until either all
jurors have been queried, or it becomes clear that further inquiry is
unnecessary. By speaking to all of the jurors, the court garners the
maximum information from which to make its final determination,
and by involving all of the jurors, does not create artificial divi-
46. See Brown, 823 F.2d at 594 (colloquy: "COURT: Now, I don't want
to know how you have voted, or the jury has voted, on anything with respect to
any defendant. But can you tell us just generally what the nature of the problem
is. Could it be a personality problem between you and other members, or any
one or more members of the jury, or is it something else?"); see also Shotikare,
779 A.2d at 345 ("The jurors' views of the case, the back and forth among them
concerning the evidence . . . their numerical division on the merits-all such
things are off limits.").
47. United States v. Gabay, 923 F.2d 1536, 1542 (1 1th Cir. 1991).
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sions within the jury room." With each additional colloquy, how-
ever, the court risks placing undue influence on jurors and in-
creases the potential for reversal on appeal.
While this role reversal, the questioning of jurors about their
deliberations, is highly unusual and places great strain on the tradi-
tional prerogatives of the jury, it is inevitable in any system that
allows dismissal for "good cause." Without this inquiry (or some-
thing else like it), there would be no basis on which to argue, or for
a court to rule on, the dismissal of a juror. In many cases it would
not even be clear which juror to dismiss.
After the examination of the jurors, counsel have a record
from which to argue, and the courts upon which to rule, for or
against disqualification. In weighing the responses of the jurors,
the court must first consider the threshold question of whether the
jurors, with the likely exception of the holdout, are in agreement
that a juror is deliberating in an aberrant manner or not deliberating
at all. Equivocation and dissent among the jurors as to the behav-
ior of the holdout juror will significantly weaken the case for re-
moval. As the Second Circuit has stated, a court confronted with
"anything but unambiguous evidence" of a refusal to deliberate
need not pursue dismissal any further than this step.49 Assuming,
however, that a relatively consistent factual basis for aberrant juror
behavior arises from the individual juror colloquies, the court re-
sumes its traditional role of arbiter rather than investigator and
must determine whether the behavior identified constitutes "good
cause" for disqualification.
C. The Decision to Disqualify: Whether Good Cause Exists
Once the court interviews the jurors and creates a record of the
jurors' deliberations, it can determine whether "good cause" under
Rule 23(b)(3) exists for dismissal of a particular juror. In practice,
48. See United States v. Symington, 195 F.3d 1080, 1088 n.7 (9th Cir.
1999) (acknowledging that the requirement that the court avoid "compromising
the secrecy of the jury's deliberations" necessitates that the "evidence available
to the district court" will be "necessarily limited"); Brown, 823 F.2d at 596
("[A] court may not delve deeply into a juror's motivations because it may not
intrude on the secrecy of the jury's deliberations.").
49. Thomas, 116 F.3d at 622.
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there are two parts to this inquiry: (i) is the juror in fact refusing to
deliberate; and (ii) is this "refusal" related in any way to the juror's
view of the evidence.
The reason for the first part is obvious. The jury system is
sufficiently flexible to allow eccentric behavior; only a purposeful
refusal to follow the court's instructions or engage in the jury
process can justify removal under Rule 23.50 The second part of
the inquiry is predicated on the federal right to a unanimous ver-
dict.5'
The federal courts recognize that the principle of unanimity is
the touchstone of the constitutionality of a dismissal under Rule
23(b)(3).5 2 As a result, the courts have fashioned removal stan-
dards that factor in unanimity concerns. The most common of
these requires that a juror may not be dismissed "if the record evi-
dence discloses any possibility that the ... discharge stems from
the juror's view of the sufficiency of the government's evidence. 5 3
This "any possibility" standard appears quite stringent.54 The pur-
50. The Thomas court was careful to acknowledge that a juror who delib-
erates in ignorance of the law, or with a misunderstanding of the law, is not the
equivalent of one who deliberates in "purposeful disregard" of the court's in-
structions. Id. at 613 n.6. Thus, the unwitting failure to understand or apply the
court's instruction would not be grounds for dismissal.
51. See supra Part I.B, discussing the right of a federal criminal defen-
dant to a unanimous verdict. This is a salient distinction between the federal and
state court systems. In the latter, as Apodaca v. Oregon held, the Constitution
does not require a unanimous verdict. 406 U.S. 404, 410-14 (1972). Therefore,
the dismissal of a dissenting juror in state court may be obtained under a more
flexible standard (depending, of course, on the applicable state law). See, e.g.,
People v. Cleveland, 21 P.3d 1225, 1237 (Cal. 2001) (distinguishing federal
standards and allowing dismissal of juror "if it appears as a 'demonstrable real-
ity' that the juror is unable or unwilling to deliberate").
52. United States v. Hemandez, 862 F.2d 17, 23 (2d Cir. 1988) ("That a
juror may not be removed because he or she disagrees with the other jurors as to
the merits of a case requires no citation."); Brown, 823 F.2d at 600 (reversing
because dismissal of juror under Rule 23(b)(3) "violated the appellants' consti-
tutional right to a unanimous verdict").
53. Thomas, 116 F.3d at 621-22 (adopting rule of Brown); Brown, 823
F.2d at 596.
54. The Ninth Circuit has articulated a possibly less stringent "any rea-
sonable possibility" standard. United States v. Symington, 195 F.3d 1080, 1087
(9th Cir. 1999) (allowing dismissal "if the record evidence discloses any reason-
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pose of the standard is to diminish the possibility that a juror is
removed because of the juror's dissenting views, rather than dis-
qualifying conduct.
For example, in United States v. Brown, after a thirteen week
trial and five weeks of deliberations, a juror sent out a note indicat-
ing that he was "not able to discharge [his] duties as a member of
th[e] jury."" The court engaged in a colloquy with the juror, in
which the juror stated that he had a problem with "the way the
R.I.C.O. conspiracy act reads"; "I can't go along with that act"; "I
disagree with it"; "It's the way it's written and the way the evi-
dence has been presented. 5 6 The trial court dismissed the juror.
Three weeks later, the eleven-member jury convicted the defen-
dants.57
While noting the "length and cost of the trial" and the "appar-
ent strength of the government's case,"5" the Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit reversed the convictions because the record dis-
closed "a possibility" that the dismissed juror simply "believe[d]
that the government ha[d] failed to present sufficient evidence to
support a conviction."5 9 The court focused on the juror's statement
in the colloquy that he could not render a verdict because of "the
way [the law was] written and the way the evidence ha[d] been
presented."6 In the court's view, the juror's statement could just
as easily have reflected dissatisfaction with the government's evi-
dence as with the RICO law. Because the juror's "desire to quit
able possibility that the impetus for a juror's dismissal stems from the juror's
view on the merits of the case"). It noted that an "any possibility" standard if
literally applied would be meaningless, because "anything is possible." Id. at
1087 n.5. The courts applying the "any possibility" standard have not inter-
preted that statement literally, however. See, e.g., United States v. Ruggiero,
928 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1991), discussed infra in text accompanying notes 78-
88. Both of the above-referenced federal standards are more stringent than that
in California state courts. See Cleveland, 21 P.3d at 1237 (distinguishing federal
standard from that in California of discretion to discharge the juror "if it appears
as a 'demonstrable reality' that the juror is unable or unwilling to deliberate").
55. 823 F.2d 591, 594 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 595.
58. Id. at 599-600.
59. Id. at 597.
60. Id. at 597.
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deliberations" possibly "stemmed from his belief that the evidence
was inadequate to support a conviction," the appellate court re-
versed.6'
In United States v. Hernandez,62 the Second Circuit encoun-
tered an analogous scenario and came to a similar result. The
jury63 sent out a note after beginning deliberations signaling a
problem with one particular juror: "We the jury in the case feel
that Juror No. Four ... has a prejudice and lacks the rational com-
mon sense to deliberate in a logical way. The individual wants to
start a case against the government ... ."6 After conducting a col-
loquy with the juror in question, the judge allowed deliberations to
continue.65 Problems continued, and on day two of deliberations,
questions arose about the juror's mental health.66 The judge stated
that he would postpone any action with respect to the juror until it
was clear that "there [was] a hung jury., 67 The jury sent out an-
other note at the end of that day, "Please bear with us as we don't
want a mistrial. We are working hard with Juror No. 4."68 When
the difficulties continued, the judge appeared on the verge of de-
claring a mistrial. 6 9 He instructed the jury that "thousands of dol-
lars are lost on a mistrial," and commended their efforts to "try to
convince Juror No. 4, in order to prevent the loss of so much time
and money."7 He then engaged in one last colloquy with juror
four, where more details about the juror's "neurosis" emerged.7"
At that point, the court dismissed the juror.7 2
The Second Circuit found the dismissal improper for three
reasons:
61. Id.
62. 862 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1988).




66. Id. at 20-21.
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(i) it is not clear in the record that the removal was be-
cause of mental incompetence rather than to avoid a
hung jury; (ii) if removal for mental incompetence was
justified, it should have occurred at the latest on the sec-
ond day of deliberations; and (iii) the statements of the
district judge just prior to the removal of No. Four pre-
vented the remaining jurors from reaching a properly
considered verdict.73
The appellate court thus reversed the conviction and remanded
for a new trial.74
Although the Second Circuit in Hernandez did not cite any au-
thority in coming to its determination, its analysis is akin to that in
Brown. As the record indicated (from the timing of the dismissal
and the judge's comments), there was a real possibility that the
juror was dismissed as much for failing to agree with the majority
as for failing to participate in deliberations.
One background circumstance that tainted the removal of the
jurors in Hernandez and Brown was that the trial court was aware
prior to dismissing the jurors that those jurors favored acquittal.
The jury's note in Hernandez stated that rather than deliberate,
juror four "want[ed] to start a case against the government. 75 In
Brown, the juror stressed that he disagreed with the expansive
scope of the RICO statute.76 Thus, the trial courts in these cases
knowingly removed holdout jurors in favor of acquittal, resulting
in a guilty verdict of the remaining eleven jurors. This type of
dismissal exhibits maximum tension with the defendant's right to a
unanimous verdict.77
The fluidity of Rule 23(b)(3) determinations is highlighted,
however, by another Second Circuit case, United States v.
Ruggiero.78 In Ruggiero, the jury sent out a note stating that it had
reached "informal" agreement for a guilty verdict, but could not
73. Id. at 23.
74. Id. at 24.
75. Id. at 20.
76. United States v. Brown, 823 F.2d 591, 594 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
77. See Hernandez, 862 F.2d at 23 ("[R]emoval of the sole holdout for
acquittal is an issue at the heart of the trial process and must be meticulously
scrutinized.").
78. 928 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1991).
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reach a "formal" verdict "due to the fears of one juror. '79 A collo-
quy with that juror revealed that during deliberations, the juror had
encountered two "well built" men who asked him if he was on the
jury for one of the defendants, but had not said anything further.8°
Under questioning from the court, the juror admitted that his vote
was motivated in part by "fear," presumably related to this inci-
dent, but the juror made other statements that suggested another
possibility for his being singled out by the majority. The juror
stated that he "had questioned some of the testimony along the
way, the various counts and whatever"; "I wasn't one hundred per-
cent sure ... of each of the counts and the accusation and things
that they actually did happen."8 2 In addition, the juror had earlier
indicated that the majority had pressured him, saying, "there w[as]
talk in the juror room concerning the fact that I could (go) to jail..
. Tollerence [sic], and patience is [sic] not prevailing in the juror
room.... I simply can't be persua[d]ed or forced to vote against
my belief and conscience. 8 3  The court dismissed the juror. 4
Shortly thereafter, the eleven-member jury informed the court that
it had reached a unanimous verdict for conviction. 5
The Ruggiero court upheld the conviction, citing the great
deference owed to the district court "in view of [the judge's] per-
sonal observations of the jurors and the parties. 8 6 The court did
not address the suggestions in the record that the juror did not
share his colleagues' view of the government's case. Rather it fo-
cused on the fact that: "The juror expressed a continuing state of
fearfulness, told the judge that he had broken down in the course of
apprising his fellow jurors of his situation, and had at one juncture
refused to render any vote at all on the counts of the indictment.'8 "
The court saw no conffict with its ruling in the Hernandez case
discussed above:
79. Id. at 1295.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1296-97.
82. Id. at 1296.
83. Id. at 1294.
84. Id. at 1297.
85. Id. at 1298.
86. Id. at 1300.
87. Id.
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We reversed and remanded for a new trial in Hernandez
because we could "not be confident that [a removed ju-
ror's] disagreement with his colleagues was not the
cause of his removal.". .. Here, by contrast, the record
is clear that Juror No. 9 was dismissed because the dis-
trict court determined, on more than ample evidence,
that the juror had been intimidated. Further, the dis-
missal followed promptly upon the court's conclusion
that intimidation had occurred and was affecting the ju-
ror's deliberations. 88
Contrasting Ruggiero with Brown and Hernandez reveals that
the determination of what constitutes "any possibility" of removal
based on a juror's views of the evidence can be seen differently by
different courts, and even different panels of the same court.
D. Post-Disqualification Choices: Replacement with an Alternate
or Deliberation with Eleven
Until 1999, the decision to remove a juror left a district court
with only one choice: a jury of eleven. The option of replacing a
deliberating juror with an alternate was explicitly disfavored by the
advisory committee notes to Rule 23(b)(3)89 and appeared fore-
closed by Rule 24(c). Rule 24(c), at that time, required the dis-
charge of alternate jurors when the jury retired for its delibera-
tions.90 Rule 24(c) was amended in 1999 to allow the trial courts
to retain alternate jurors after jury deliberations, and then replace a
juror who has been removed during deliberations with an alternate
88. Id. at 1302 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Hernan-
dez, 862 F.2d 17, 23 (2d Cir. 1988)).
89. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b) advisory committee's notes to 1983 Amend-
ments.
90. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c); see also United States v. Beard, 161 F.3d
1190, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (reversing dismissal of two jurors and replacement
with alternates); United States v. McFarland, 34 F.3d 1508, 1513 (9th Cir. 1994)
("In this circuit, it is error for a district court to substitute alternate jurors unless
the defendant has given an express waiver of his rights under Rule 24(c).");
United States v. Beasley, 464 F.2d 468, 469 (10th Cir. 1972) (finding that the
"inclusion of the alternate in any proceeding commenced by the jury itself after
it retires to deliberate is ground for a mistrial").
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juror.9' The jury must then be instructed to begin deliberations
anew. The 1999 amendment leaves the trial court with expanded
choices, and the potential to remove and replace up to six jurors-
the number of alternates permitted under Rule 24(c)(l)--during
the course of deliberations.92 Adding this choice to the trial court's
menu will no doubt increase challenges to the exercise of its dis-
cretion. As the amendment is fairly recent and appears not to have
been absorbed into common practice, the federal appellate courts
have not yet spoken to the issue. One expects that case law will
eventually limit the trial courts' discretion to use (or not to use)
alternates after a Rule 23(b)(3) dismissal. Thus, it remains to be
seen how the 1999 amendment to Rule 24(c) will affect Rule
23(b)(3) jurisprudence.
At a minimum, the ability to replace dismissed jurors allevi-
ates the conflict that an eleven-member jury verdict creates with
the traditional twelve-member jury standard. It does nothing,
however, to limit the intrusion that Rule 23(b)(3) authorizes upon
the traditional prerogatives of a jury (secrecy and non-
accountability), and to eliminate the tension between the broad
range of dismissals allowed under the Rule and the otherwise un-
questioned requirement that the jury's verdict be unanimous.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF GOOD CAUSE DISMISSALS FOR REFUSING To
DELIBERATE
The application of Rule 23(b)(3), as discussed above, provides
a small window into the difficulties of trying to map a belief in the
sanctity of a verdict rendered by twelve impartial citizens, ac-
countable to no one, onto the practical day-to-day administration of
91. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c)(3). The rule now reads: "The court may re-
tain alternate jurors after the jury retires to deliberate. The court must ensure
that a retained alternate does not discuss the case with anyone until that alternate
replaces a juror or is discharged. If an alternate replaces a juror after delibera-
tions have begun, the court must instruct the jury to begin its deliberations
anew." Id.
92. There is little federal case law on this topic. One of the few opinions
mentioning the expanded options now available to trial courts is an unpublished
opinion from the Second Circuit, United States v. Dixon, 79 F. App'x 456, 457
(2d Cir. 2003).
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justice. While something is indisputably added to the practical
workings of judicial administration by Rule 23(b)(3)'s "good
cause" disqualifications, something is taken away as well. Two
concerns are most prominent.
First, it is impossible to review the case law concerning Rule
23(b)(3) and not be struck by the role that chance plays in these
cases. As the interplay between even the few cases discussed
above applying Rule 23(b)(3) demonstrates, the question of the
removal of a juror who is not "properly" participating in delibera-
tions is complex and entirely fact-dependent. Yet very few facts
are available.93 In the final analysis, the determination depends
primarily on the statements of lay jurors in unstructured, but se-
verely limited colloquies with judges. Jurors, no doubt intimidated
by individual questioning by a federal judge in the presence of a
prosecutor, are unlikely to articulate with clarity the reasons for the
deliberative impasse. Thus, the chance statements that come out in
the colloquies, and those left unsaid, ultimately determine whether
a juror is dismissed. For example, if the juror in Brown had not
added a passing comment ("and the way the evidence has been
presented"),94 the appellate court would probably have reached the
opposite result. It is not clear that such weighty determinations as
whether a dissenting juror has been removed from the jury for
simply failing to agree with the majority should hinge to such a
great degree on chance.
Chance also plays the primary role in determining whether the
courts even become aware that a potential for dismissal exists.
Only when a jury self-identifies the problem in a way that signals
to the court that a minority of jurors are holding up deliberations
does the removal process even commence. Many jurors, no doubt,
would not think to send out such a note, unaware that such a proc-
ess exists. Thus, the current rule puzzlingly relies on jurors to draft
93. Cf. United States v. Symington, 195 F.3d 1080, 1088 n.7 (9th Cir.
1999) (acknowledging that the requirement that the court avoid "compromising
the secrecy of the jury's deliberations" necessitates that the "evidence available
to the district court" will be "necessarily limited"); United States v. Brown, 823
F.2d 591, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("[A] court may not delve deeply into a juror's
motivations because it may not intrude on the secrecy of the jury's delibera-
tions.").
94. Brown; 823 F.2d at 597.
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a note that hits upon a Rule 23(b)(3) "good cause" formulation,
while providing no information to the jurors that "good cause"
dismissal is even available, or on what grounds. Moreover, the
reliance on chance to initiate and provide a factual basis for a Rule
23(b)(3) "refusal to deliberate" dismissal suggests an ambivalence
on the part of the Rule's drafters, and a self-contradictory desire
that the Rule exist, but be underutilized. 95
Second, it does not appear that courts have adequately consid-
ered or resolved the tension that a Rule 23(b)(3) dismissal for re-
fusing to deliberate places on a right to a "unanimous" verdict.
Clearly if a juror refuses to vote with the majority and is then re-
moved from the jury, the verdict is only "unanimous" in a
Kafkaesque sense. In any case in which the juror would cast a
vote, but not the vote of the majority, that juror's dismissal has
resulted in a non-unanimous verdict. This is true whatever the rea-
son for the vote, i.e., whether the vote is the result of an opinion
about the evidence presented, the validity of the law at issue, or a
result of a completely irrational impulse. 96 If a jury has the power
to vote to convict or acquit without review, it follows that an indi-
vidual juror may do the same. To dismiss such a juror for refusing
to deliberate properly, such as for failing to follow the court's in-
structions or for refusing to apply the law, is not consistent with
this power (just as the court would not have the power to reverse
an acquittal if it felt that the jury had failed to follow the court's
instructions).97 While a juror who refuses to play by the rules in
95. There are no clear solutions to lessen the role of chance in continued
application of Rule 23(b)(3) to refusals to deliberate. Remedies such as a jury
instruction that informs jurors of the existence of a mechanism for the removal
of a non-deliberating juror, and/or a more structured colloquy process perhaps
including standardized written questionnaires, likely would create more prob-
lems than they would solve. In addition, jurors who are made aware of a proc-
ess to eliminate other jurors may attempt to "game" the system by structuring
notes and colloquies in a way designed to dismiss a juror who simply disagrees
with their assessment of the case. This latter problem will become more pro-
nounced as more jurors inevitably become aware of the rule's existence.
96. A distinction should be drawn between jurors who are dismissed
involuntarily by the court and those who willingly step down for reasons of
health or fear, etc. In addition, it is worth emphasizing that the alternative to a
Rule 23(b)(3) dismissal is not a non-majority verdict, but a mistrial.
97. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16 (1978) ("[W]e necessarily
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this manner frustrates the smooth workings of judicial administra-
tion, the indulgence of such behavior is a necessary prerequisite of
a right to a unanimous verdict-a right which, at least in the fed-
eral system, is not contested.
More to the point, efforts to ferret out and remove "non-
deliberating" jurors may cause more damage than the behavior
itself. It is clear that the federal system, as structured in the Con-
stitution, does not prioritize to the exclusion of all else the follow-
ing of the court's instructions. If it did, the Constitution would
leave the ultimate decision of guilt or innocence to the court itself.
To the contrary, the decision to leave this determination to the jury
signals an invitation to other factors to enter the equation. As
Judge Learned Hand wrote, the unique appeal of trial by jury is
that "no one is likely to suffer of whose conduct they [the jury] do
not morally disapprove."98 According to Judge Hand, "this intro-
duces a slack into the enforcement of law, tempering its rigor by
the mollifying influence of current ethical conventions." 99 By dis-
missing individual jurors who do not follow the law as the court
commands, this slack is lessened. While such a slack-less system
may be desirable from an efficiency standpoint, it is inconsistent
with the traditional jury trial right, and chiefly with the require-
ment that a criminal verdict in federal court be unanimous. This
inconsistency, combined with the practical considerations which
make Rule 23(b)(3) dismissals problematic-primarily the role of
chance in determining such dismissals---calls for a reexamination
of the extension of Rule 23(b)(3) to "refusals to deliberate."
afford absolute finality a jury's verdict of acquittal-no matter how erroneous its
decision .... ).
98. United States ex rel. McCann v. Adams, 126 F.2d 774, 776 (2d Cir.
1942).
99. Id.
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